By David Strachan-Morris, Lecturer in Intelligence and Security at the University of Leicester
Arguments for the establishment of an Irish national intelligence agency have been made through the Azure Forum and in the press. These have focused on the strategic need for intelligence but in order to address some of the very valid concerns about the creation of such an agency, they need to address the ‘how’ as well as the ‘why’. One of the first steps in the ‘how’ of establishing a national intelligence agency in Ireland is reconciling the tension between the liberal state and the existence of an agency that will be operating largely out of sight of the population and may even have to surveil that population. Liberal democracies do not have a good record when it comes to resolving this tension and in times of war or other crises, such as the threat of terrorism, history shows they can become very illiberal indeed. By making legitimacy and trust the cornerstones of intelligence, Ireland can go a long way towards mitigating the potential harm that could be done to civil society. Engaging with academic thought and research on these issues can provide some practical ways forward, especially if we look beyond the usual examples of the UK and United States. International organisations and other small states have faced issues of trust and legitimacy, and provide potentially useful solutions.
The legitimacy for state security organisations is based on the social contract between the state and its citizens. Citizens agree to give up some of their rights and freedoms in exchange for the state providing safety and security. By establishing an agency that can forewarn of potential threats and opportunities, the state is performing its function of providing protection and security but, as Hobbes, Lock, and Rousseau warn, the state must continue to respect the rights and freedoms of its citizens and ensure adequate oversight to prevent breaches or abuse.
There must be careful thought and open debate about the role, legislation, operating guidelines, and oversight of an Irish national intelligence agency in order to establish its legitimacy. As previously argued in Azure Forum articles, this can be achieved through a robust and transparent methodology for creating the agency.
Ireland, however, does differ from many other states because of its stated neutrality and its emphasis on collaboration, soft power, peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. Establishing a new national intelligence agency would seem to be at odds with these values. This is a similar problem to that faced by the United Nations, which has only recently formally created an intelligence function. Since its creation, the UN has resisted a formal intelligence function and, in fact, the word ‘intelligence’ was even banned (even though this is effectively what was happening in many missions with the creation of Joint Mission Analysis Centres). The increase in attacks against UN missions and peacekeepers, especially during the mission to Mali, led to the formation of UN Peacekeeping Intelligence and the UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Academy. Following extensive consultations with members states, intelligence leaders, academics and other stakeholders, the UN overcame objections to the creation of this function by being very explicit about its purpose and method of operation. While it is unlikely that Ireland will limit intelligence activity to the same extent as the UN, there is a model here for establishing intelligence as a legitimate function of the state and a national intelligence agency as the legitimate organ of state to conduct that function.
Gaining and maintaining the trust of the population should also be a key consideration in the creation of a national intelligence agency. Ireland is in the fortunate position of being a relatively ‘high trust’ society. According to the OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Institutions for 2023, trust in the police is at 70%; the courts and the judicial system is at 69%; and the national civil service is at 66%. This is comparable with states that are often held up as beacons of liberal democracy, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, and much higher than trust in similar institutions in the UK. Trust in the national government in Ireland is at 49%, again comparable with Denmark and the Netherlands. Importantly, for this argument, trust in the Irish government to protect the lives of its population in time of emergency is 60%, higher than the OECD average of 53%. Finally, the trust in the ability of the government to explain the impact of a major reform is higher than the OECD average, but since these averages are 54% and 39% respectively it does show there would still be considerable work needed. Social cohesion is also high, with 83% of the population saying they trust each other. None of this is to say that trust in an intelligence agency is a given, or that the trust of the Irish people should be treated lightly, but it does give grounds for cautious optimism that with sufficiently wide and transparent consultation and debate, and careful explanation, an Irish intelligence agency would start with a reasonable baseline of trust. Keeping that trust will depend a great deal on the agency itself.
As with establishing legitimacy, there are models that Ireland can look to when thinking about intelligence and trust in society. There is a growing body of work on intelligence in high trust societies written by scholars from Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. None of these countries are perfect and all have had their intelligence scandals, but they provide useful lessons to learn from and frameworks for thinking about how intelligence fits into the relationship between state and society, and how intelligence agencies in these societies interact with the rest of the international system. The latter is important because Ireland will be heavily reliant on partners, so choosing those partners and maintaining their trust will be a delicate balancing act with maintaining the trust of the Irish people.
While the arguments for creating such an agency are loud, strong and growing, the difficulties in doing so have often been presented as insurmountable. There will be some very difficult decisions and compromises to be made in establishing an Irish intelligence agency, but the literature shows us that these are far from insurmountable.
David Strachan-Morris is a Lecturer in Intelligence and Security at the University of Leicester. His research and writing covers national intelligence, counterinsurgency, and private military and security companies.
