By Paddy McGuinness, former UK Deputy National Security Advisor
The UK’s Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June, alters the strategic context for Ireland. It concludes that “High Intensity Warfare in Europe is no longer a distant prospect. We must be ready for it to reach our homeland”. That shift in UK posture inevitably raises questions: how will Ireland respond to the changing threat landscape? What revised role will it play in ensuring security on the island of Ireland and in the surrounding seas, skies, and cyberspace including in so called “grey-zone” conflict and any transition to war? As Europe increasingly aligns with the UK’s assessment of risk, what contribution will Ireland make as an EU Member State? And as the UK Armed Forces work to adapt in light of Ukraine’s lessons, how will the Irish Defence Forces ensure they are equipped for the challenges of this new era?
Five themes stand out from this 145 page review. First, there is an unprecedented emphasis on the defence of the UK itself, with a shift from expeditionary warfare to resilience at home. Second, it identifies a generational challenge posed by state-based threats, notably authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
Third, the Review elevates space, cyber, and AI to core defence priorities, calling for sovereign capabilities and enhanced allied collaboration. The lessons of Ukraine, especially the impact of unmanned platforms, AI-enabled warfare and layered aerial assault, loom large. Fourth, the Review puts “NATO First”, stepping up on European defence with strengthened nuclear, “new tech” and updated conventional capabilities. The Indo-Pacific tilt is still there with strengthened regional partnerships with Australia and Japan, but the expectation of conflict in the UK’s near abroad is greater. Finally, the need for whole-of-society resilience is stressed with a shift from defence to so-called deterrence by denial. A new “National Resilience Framework” and updated Civil Contingencies Act are promised to make UK society more robust against hybrid and non-military threats.
This review is in no sense a plan to be implemented or a shopping list. The high-level framing and the independence of the reviewers (comprising former NATO Secretary General and Labour Defence Minister Lord Robertson; first term Trump advisor Dr Fiona Hill; and former General Sir Richard Barrons) allows the UK government some leeway. The Government “endorses and will implement the Review” but the level of resource to be applied for its delivery is the subject of ongoing debate. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has this week committed to a NATO target of spending five percent of GDP on “National Security” by 2035, made up of 3.5 percent on “hard” defence and 1.5 percent for wider security such as cyber, borders, and infrastructure resilience. In the near term this will be 2.6 percent by 2027, rising to three percent in the Parliament following the 2029 elections “as fiscal conditions allow”. This is very much not just about money (assuming these ambitions are met). The higher end would need the UK Government to intervene extensively to re-industrialise and create secure supply chains, to build skills in the workforce and focus them on the defence sector. A form of mobilisation of the population or at least some significant cultural changes around military service and a collective approach to resilience and economic security would be required.
So what does the Review mean for Ireland?
The Review’s findings present a further test for Irish military neutrality. The language in the Review emphasises NATO and the implication is that the UK will be engaged in the European theatre, with its nuclear deterrent providing a security umbrella for Europe’s NATO members. The UK’s view of the changed context is shared by the most militarily capable states of the EU such as France, Germany, Sweden, Poland and coordination on combat capability and the industrial base is growing. Ireland is not obliged to join in building larger armed forces, modernising equipment and a strengthened defence industrial base through joint investment (though there is an opportunity for Irish defence companies). It cannot avoid coordinated EU measures short of warfare and shared defence of infrastructure. Confrontation in these hybrid warfare settings are the likely escalation routes to declared conflict.
The Review does not refer to “espionage" or “subversion” but rather “grey zone operations”, “malign influence” and “sabotage”. In this context, Ireland’s updating of its own capabilities to counter those who would exploit its territory is not remarked upon but will be appreciated.
The Review aims to innovate, driven by lessons from Ukraine. These are profound lessons for the Irish Defence Forces - its deployment, equipment, training and recruitment. Increasingly air or naval unmanned systems have the advantage on the battlefield, enabled by at least partially automated targeting and assured access to data especially from space. Basic tactics have been transformed with more battlefield lethality precision from proficiency with low-cost drones than with the rifle. The UK is playing hard at catch up and the Irish will need to do so too.
The Ukraine experience and current exchanges between Israel and Iran draw out the importance of air and missile defence against threats ranging from drone swarms to hypersonic missiles. This is for the homeland almost more than deployed forces. The Review talks of the UK rebuilding its integrated air defence systems with “a new generation of sensors, interceptors and decision-making systems”. It would seem likely that Ireland would want to be under that cover or have some other EU source of assurance?
A major lesson from Ukraine is that “emerged” technologies (such as the cyber domain including the full range of electronic warfare, physical infrastructure like undersea cables and access to space) are now a battle-space including during this current period of hybrid warfare. The data centres and resident technology companies of modern Ireland and the supporting infrastructure including under the sea are exactly the attack surface and neutrality is unlikely to be a protection.
The Review’s emphasis on the UK becoming “Secure at Home” through an all of society approach and revised resilience arrangements cannot but intersect with Ireland’s interests. Much of the interaction will be North-South through long agreed systems. Some, such as cyber, invite more formal East-West arrangements. Europe features in the welcome emphasis on cooperation on maritime security including the protection of sub-sea communications and energy infrastructure.
The security task in the North still warrants inclusion despite the manifestly growing issues elsewhere. The Review explains that “[t]he threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism continues to endure. Violent dissident republican groups remain active and pose a threat to security forces and the wider community in Northern Ireland” and “rely on criminal activities to fund their operations and maintain influence”. Loyalism is not mentioned.
Irish readers should take no comfort from what is omitted from the text of the Review. There is no expectation of an Irish contribution to the modern defence of these islands: no Trumpian complaint or threat because Ireland is perceived not to be paying its way for the security umbrella it enjoys. Nor does the Labour Government’s support for UK armed forces veterans extend to changes in law to protect them from prosecution in the North. The defence significance of Northern Ireland is, if anything, understated in the Review to the point where Unionist politicians at Westminster have complained. This Labour restraint reflects a Government determined to reset relations. For the reviewers themselves, Ireland was a detail set against larger strategic issues. Other conceivable UK administrations after 2029 are likely to be less forgiving.
Some have criticised the UK Review for not being radical enough, for including too much Cold War thinking and neglecting societal and climate challenges. Others complain that it does not mandate and resource desperately needed change. At a minimum it offers Ireland a rather sobering yardstick for the nation’s own thinking over its posture and future defence.
Paddy McGuinness CMG OBE is a member of the Azure Forum’s Advisory Council and a former British Deputy National Security Advisor for Intelligence, Security and Resilience. He now advises business globally on crisis and resilience, on technology risks and the interplay between geopolitics, national security and their transactions.

